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Introduction
In their interesting and challenging chapter John Adams and Peter Robinson 
assess the consequences for economic development policy of the devolution 
measures enacted by the UK Labour government post 1997. Their chapter 
ranges widely over current UK regional disparities, the link between devolution 
and economic growth, the balance of responsibilities in policy between 
Whitehall and the devolved administrations, and finally, they raise questions 
about the developing “quasi-federal” role of Whitehall in regulating or co-
ordinating the new devolved policy landscape.
In response, we propose to focus on four issues that we believe are key to 
understanding the economic consequences of devolution both at the Scottish 
and UK levels. First, we argue that the view of Scotland’s devolutionary 
experience in economic policy is partial and so does not fully capture the 
nature and extent of change post 1999. Secondly, we examine the role of 
devolution in regional economic performance. There is much in their paper on 
this topic with which we agree but we contend that there are significant 
omissions in the analysis, which are important for policy choice. Our third
section highlights an area not discussed in depth by Adams and Robinson’s 
paper: the funding of the devolution settlement. Here we consider some of the 
implications of funding arrangements for economic performance and the 
options for a new funding settlement. Finally, we deal with the difficult issue of 
co-ordination between the centre and the devolved regions. We contend that 
co-ordination is largely conspicuous by its absence.  Moreover, where co-
ordination is deployed it reflects an inadequate understanding of the extent to 
which the economies of the regions and devolved territories of the UK are 
linked.
1. Scottish Experience
Adams and Robinson argue that the Scottish devolutionary experience in 
economic policy is that policy divergence has been “less dramatic” post 
devolution than it was before. They draw on Gillespie and Benneworth (2002) 
who stress that administrative devolution from the mid 1970s onwards and the 
response to pressures from nationalist movements, led to policy innovations 
such as the creation of the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) in 1975, and 
the formation of Scottish Enterprise and Highlands and Islands Enterprise in 
19911. Thus economic policy in Scotland began to diverge considerably long 
before political devolution commenced in 1999. Moreover, the innovations 
adopted by Scottish Enterprise, such as an emphasis on clusters, and a well 
researched and specified business birth rate policy, led the English regions 
through the DTI and the RDAs to seek to adopt some of these earlier Celtic 
innovations2. Gillespie and Benneworth (2002) argue that these developments 
offer examples of some policy convergence post 1999, but we would point to 
a number of innovative examples in economic policy after the creation of the 
Scottish Parliament.
Adams and Robinson see much commonality between the UK Government’s 
policy framework and the Framework for Economic Development (FEDS), 
which was the Scottish Executive’s first economic development policy strategy 
document introduced in 2000. FEDS emphasised the importance of supply-
side drivers of productivity such as innovation and skills, stressed the key role 
of market forces and offered the primary justification for policy intervention as 
market failure. Adams and Robinson see FEDS as reaffirming much of the UK 
Government’s policy framework. In contrast, Cooke (2005) characterises 
economic development policy in the devolved administrations as visionary in 
Scotland, precautionary in Wales and constrained in Northern Ireland. Cooke 
acknowledges the innovation in Scottish economic development policy prior to 
1999 but highlights the visionary nature of post devolution policy through the 
attempt to promote a science-based economy as charted in the strategy 
                                           
1 The Highlands and Islands Development Board (HIDB) preceded the creation of the SDA by 
at least a decade and both were merged with the Training Agency to form, respectively, 
Scottish Enterprise and Highlands and Island Enterprise in 1991.
2 It can be argued that these policy exemplars have moved on in Scotland with, for example, 
the business birth rate strategy now, following a Review, focusing on high-growth starts and a 
greater emphasis on life-cycle support for businesses (Scottish Enterprise, 2005).
document for the enterprise networks Smart Successful Scotland3 published 
in 2001.  This regional development strategy can be viewed as the first 
attempt in the UK, and perhaps in Europe, to recognise the importance of 
linking scientific commercialisation and entrepreneurship within a specifically 
open economy context.
Adams and Robinson follow Gillespie and Benneworth (2002) in concluding 
that the Scottish Executive has not been particularly innovative in using its 
powers of industrial intervention, citing Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) 
as a specific example. According to these authors RSA has simply been “re-
badged and streamlined rather than more comprehensively re-aligned with the 
interventionist approach alluded to in FEDS” (Gillespie and Benneworth 
(2002), p 76). Clearly, judgements as to whether a policy change is innovative 
or not are likely to be subjective. However, we take the view that the Scottish 
Executive’s Review of RSA in 2001 was substantial and led to significant 
changes in both the nature and operation of policy4. 
                                           
3 Smart Successful Scotland established policy along 3 dimensions: 1. Growing Businesses
which pioneered a Business Growth Fund, allowing small companies to access RSA through 
less bureaucratic procedures; Proof of Concept Fund; Scottish Co-Investment Fund; the 
Edinburgh University-Stanford link; the Intermediary Technology Institutes (ITIs); enterprise 
education  in primary and secondary schools sponsored by Scottish entrepreneurs. 2. Skills 
and Learning: the creation inter alia of Careers Scotland offering all-age careers advice. 3. 
Global Connections: merged Locate in Scotland and Scottish Trade International to create 
Scottish Development International one organisation focused on attracting high value R&D, 
creating partnerships and seeking to assist the commercialisation of Scottish generated 
knowledge; the creation of Globalscot – a network of Scottish business expatriates to draw on 
their knowledge and expertise; creation of Event Scotland to bring major international events 
to Scotland. The subsequent creation of the Fresh Talent Initiative represents a broadening 
out of the Global connections approach to the attraction of mobile skilled labour as well as 
knowledge capital.
4 The application of the scheme was aligned with the objectives of Smart Successful 
Scotland, and a greater emphasis was placed on supporting investments in indigenous high-
growth companies, with support for R&D and investment in intangible assets such as know-
how, patents and other intellectual property. The Executive also acknowledged the need to 
accept a greater degree of risk to public funds in its assessment of RSA applications involving 
university spinouts, hi-tech start-ups and other knowledge-intensive activities. In addition, the 
rationale for awarding support was changed in several ways. First, the procedures for small 
companies was streamlined. Secondly, the generation of value added rather than job creation 
was given a greater weight in assessment. Finally, a sizable part of the budget that had 
previously been assigned for RSA purposes - £20 million - was diverted to support equity 
investments in innovation through the creation of the Scottish Co-investment Fund. Further 
developments to this funding package have since been announced. All of these preceded any 
comparable change in RSA in the rest of the UK.
Adams and Robinson end their discussion of policy developments in the 
devolved territories by concluding that most divergence has been institutional 
and that where significant differences in economic development policies have 
occurred their roots lie in the earlier administrative, rather than the later 
political, devolution. While this may be true of England Wales and Northern 
Ireland, it is worth noting that in Scotland the principal delivery agencies of 
economic policy – Scottish Enterprise, Highlands and Islands Enterprise, the 
Local Enterprise Companies – have not changed5. Moreover, under political 
devolution the changes in policy did mark a major break with the past6. First, 
FEDS and Smart Successful Scotland placed economic development policy 
for the first time in a strategic framework and a framework that differed in 
several important respects from elsewhere (Ashcroft, 2002). Secondly, 
devolved policy built on the successful economic policy innovations introduced 
in the 1990s but adapted them to meet the requirements of the new strategic 
vision within a specific open economy context, which as Cooke (2005) argues, 
sought “to position Scotland to exploit to the full the Knowledge Economy” (p. 
44). Finally, as Cooke further points out the implementation of this strategic 
vision led to the adoption of some major policy innovations, the Intermediary 
Technology Institutes being a prime example.7
2. Devolution and Economic Performance
The role of the economy in the devolution process and the effect of devolution 
on economic performance has to be set in the context of the nature and extent 
                                           
5 Change has occurred within these agencies as they have sought to streamline their back-
office functions.
6 It might be argued that the presence of well-established institutions such as the Scottish 
Office and Scottish Enterprise made the transition to devolution, and the adoption of new 
policies, smoother than it might otherwise have been.
7 The Intermediary Technology Institutes (ITIs) are one of the key components of Scottish 
Enterprise’s approach to strengthening innovation and R&D in Scotland. Three Intermediary 
Technology Institutes: ITI Life Sciences; ITI Energy; and ITI Techmedia, have been created. 
Scottish Enterprise is investing heavily in the ITIs with £450million earmarked to be spent on 
them over the next 10 years. They operate as a “hub” for identifying, commissioning and 
diffusing pre-competitive research, embracing emerging markets, maximising the value of IPR 
and seeking to integrate new technologies into the market place. They are open for 
membership to companies and research institutions that will actively participate in its 
activities. 
of UK regional disparities, attitudes towards them and the scope for devolved 
policy to influence economic performance. The role of the economy in driving 
the motivation for devolution is quite a different issue from the impact of 
devolution on the economy. 
Adams and Robinson argue that there has been remarkably little change in 
the pattern of regional and territorial disparities since they emerged in the 
1930s, but cite Scotland as being an exception to this pattern with GVA per 
head rising relative to the UK from the 1970s to almost current parity with the 
UK8. In the light of this it is difficult to argue (pages 10 and 12) that support for 
devolution in Scotland was driven by the belief that it would improve the 
quality of people’s lives in terms of policy, including economic policy, 
outcomes. In fact it appears that there has never been a majority of 
respondents to surveys, either before or after devolution, expecting a 
favourable impact of the Scottish Parliament on the Scottish economy. So, in 
1999, only 43% of respondents expected the Parliament to improve 
Scotland’s economy. Respondents were more convinced that political 
devolution would give ordinary people a greater say in how Scotland was 
governed than to any certainty of economic impact. (McCrone, 2003 and 
Bromley, Curtice, and Given, 2005).
The apparent scepticism of the Scottish people with respect to the favourable 
impact of devolution on the economy is perhaps a reflection of the lack of 
certainty amongst professionals and academic experts on the nature and 
extent of the impact. As Adams and Robinson point out “the link between 
devolution and economic performance has been one of the most hotly 
debated topics in the field of territorial politics” (page 10). They cite academic 
argument to suggest that regional institutional capacity matters to economic 
performance, that the impact of regional government on economic growth is 
                                           
8 The explanation offered for Scotland’s relative improvement is problematic. First, the relative 
rise in GDP per head started in the early 1960s not 1970s. Secondly, he offers no evidence 
that the improvement was due “in large part to the exploitation of North Sea oilfield and 
associated benefits to Scotland’s financial and banking industries” (p.3). The role of a 
strengthened UK regional policy in attracting inward – specifically US – investment to 
Scotland and the independent growth of Scottish financial services, as well as the onshore 
impacts of oil, are the most likely reasons (Ashcroft, 2002).
contested and that the relationship between democracy and regional 
economic performance is ambiguous. While we would not necessarily 
disagree with these views, there are other ways in which devolution might 
affect the economy and in particular we would highlight the literature on fiscal 
federalism.
From a conventional fiscal federalist perspective, the economic arguments for 
devolution concern the provision and financing of local public goods, such as 
health and education expenditures9. There would appear to be three broad 
routes through which devolution might affect “economic efficiency”: in the 
allocation of public goods and services to meet Scottish preferences and 
needs10; in the allocation of inputs or resources to productive public use; and 
in the allocation of resources between present and future consumption i.e. 
through growth11. But a priori, devolution may incur costs as well as benefits 
to economic efficiency as Table 1 indicates.
Table 1 suggests that political devolution in Scotland may have had 
favourable or unfavourable effects on information, resources, incentives, and 
coordination in the formulation and implementation of policy. In Ashcroft, 
McGregor and Swales (2005a) we discuss the issues surrounding the impact 
of devolution on the Scottish economy outlined in Table 1 above. We also look 
at some evidence and conclude that the impact of devolution on the Scottish 
economy requires further research and that the effect is likely to be complex, 
subtle and difficult to measure. 
                                           
9 The literature suggests that national public goods, such as defence, foreign affairs, should 
be provided nationally and that the external, or spillover, effects of local macroeconomic and 
distributional policies warrants that they be reserved to the national level. Conversely, 
compatibility of expenditure choices on local public goods with local preferences is best 
ensured by appropriate devolution. Devolution to Scotland and Wales has broadly followed 
this approach in the specification of the powers reserved to the centre. Tiebout (1956), 
Musgrave (1959), and Oates, 1972 are the classic accounts and Oates, 1999, provides a 
survey.
10 This would embrace the social inclusion agenda, which can be viewed as part of 
economists’ standard definition of economic efficiency embracing the questions of what, how, 
and for whom to produce.
11 The effect of devolution on policy therefore embraces both static economic efficiencies (i.e. 
one-off effects on the allocation of goods and resources) and dynamic efficiencies (i.e. 
growth).
Table 1. The Economic Benefits and Costs of Scottish Devolution
Potential benefits Potential Costs
Provision better reflecting local 
preferences
The direct administration costs of an 
additional layer of government (in this 
case the Scottish Parliament) 
Local democratic accountability 
improving: efficiency of policy 
formulation, implementation, 
innovation
Inadequate monitoring, 
implementation and evaluation. (Is 
HM Treasury tougher than the 
Scottish Parliament?) 
Better information on the local 
economic environment12
The loss of economies of scale in the 
conduct of policy
HQ effect stimulating local services Increased rent seeking
Barnett imposes strict limit on 
Executive’s discretionary expenditures 
and the tax varying power allows 
marginal changes in taxation and 
spending.
Smaller budget due to strict 
adherence to Barnett
No mechanism linking public 
spending with tax revenues raised in 
Scotland13
Lower coordination/ compliance costs Reduced co-ordination with the rest of 
the UK
Source: Ashcroft, McGregor and Swales (2005a).
Anecdotally there is only limited evidence of policy changing to better reflect 
Scottish preferences. Since devolution, the relative pattern of expenditure is 
little changed. Stronger preferences for health and education, relative to 
England, are evident though the changes are modest14. Policy has diverged in 
areas of indirect consequence for the economy such as university tuition fees, 
care for the elderly and in the economic development policies underpinning 
                                           
12 “Local” informational advantages are often regarded as one of the benefits of 
decentralisation. Given that Scotland enjoyed administrative decentralisation prior to 
devolution this is a less obvious source of gain in this case. However, if, as seems likely, 
democratic accountability results in pressures that improve local information, then devolution 
may bring genuine gains through this mechanism.
13 Aspects of this are not costs of devolution per se, but relevant to whether a greater degree 
of fiscal independence would generate larger gains. 
14 Bell and Christie (2001) find no statistically significant changes in the pattern of public 
expenditure in Scotland post devolution, although there study was conducted relatively soon 
after the commencement of devolution.
Smart Successful Scotland noted above. And some of these policies, such as 
care for the elderly, are likely to have a bigger impact on the pattern of 
expenditure in the future than at present. 
However, there is concern in Scotland that the adoption and implementation 
of policy does not ‘fit’ fully with the declared preferences of the Scottish 
Executive and, we must assume, the preferences of the Scottish electorate15. 
The Scottish executive has made economic growth its paramount policy 
priority and placed much emphasis on securing improvements in the efficiency 
of delivery. But Wood (2005) finds that the share of primary expenditure on 
economic development policy has fallen from 7.4% to 5.5% between 1999 
and 2005. Other expenditures classified as supporting development grew 
more slowly than overall public expenditure in Scotland (30% compared to 
41%) implying a declining share, although less severe than that of primary 
development spend. Moreover, Wood also found that the share of such 
expenditures going to rural areas was significantly in excess of their 
population share. This latter might be an example of the possible increased 
opportunities for rent seeking following devolution, which created a number of 
new agents with influence over policy, most obviously MSPs, that in turn has 
stimulated a host of lobbying organisations and other interest groups. Added 
to this is the finding of the Parliament’s Finance Committee that the revealed 
commitment to efficiency savings within the Executive was less than that 
promised by the UK government and less than originally claimed by the 
Executive itself (Finance Committee, 2004).
                                           
15 This raises the possibility of principal-agent problems between the electorate and Executive 
and chimes with the ‘new fiscal federalism’ (Oates, 2004), which contends that politicians and 
civil servants may be more concerned with their own utility than that of the electorate, so, for 
example, seeking to maximise the size of the budget rather than the efficiency with which it is 
spent.
3. Funding
The financial resources available to the Scottish Executive and the other 
devolved administrations principally depend on the budget assigned by 
Westminster16. The Barnett formula, which determines the assigned budget, 
allocates a population share to Scotland of increments to public spending on 
comparable programmes in England and Wales. Since devolution, the formula 
has been applied more rigorously with population weights updated annually 
(Heald & ?, 2005). At the start of devolution, public expenditure in Scotland on 
comparable programmes was in excess of its population share and so the 
effect of a rigid adherence to Barnett will be to reduce relative public spending 
in Scotland, ultimately  - although over a much-extended period – moving to 
the English figure in real per capita terms. This has adverse consequences for 
GDP and employment in Scotland, as well as in the other devolved territories 
(Ferguson, et al, 2003).
Adams and Robinson recognise the so called so called ‘Barnett squeeze’ is 
the issue most likely to ignite territorial rivalry in the UK.  But perhaps Barnett 
has reached the limits of appropriateness as the principal territorial funding 
mechanism in the UK, and may in any event become unsustainable as 
convergence in per capita spending levels raises the demands for an 
alternative.17
Hallwood and Macdonald (2005) survey the range of fiscal federal systems 
around the world – all reflecting different trade-offs between equity and 
efficiency. They argue that a form of fiscal federalism should be adopted in the 
funding of the devolved territories in the UK, with a greater alignment of 
revenue and spending powers to overcome the present vertical imbalance 
                                           
16
In Scotland, other sources of revenue include Council Tax, Non-Domestic Rate Income, 
charges, and realised efficiency savings. The variable income tax provision of a 3p change in 
the basic rate – the Tartan tax – has not been used in the first two Parliaments.
17 While Adams and Robinson (p24) may well be correct in their assertion that the 2004 
settlement implied that “the Barnett formula had a much lower profile in northern England than 
in previous years”, the fundamental issue for the financing of the devolved territories, and the 
English regions, is long-term in nature. 
implicit in Barnett. They take the view that the current funding mechanism 
unduly trades off efficiency in favour of equity and that moving to a more fiscal 
federalist system would require some sacrifice of equity in favour of potentially 
greater efficiency. While their approach perhaps fails to acknowledge the hard 
budget constraint implicit in Barnett, and hence the presence of an incentive 
to efficient spending, it is also correct that the present funding mechanism 
provides no link between public spending and tax revenues raised in 
Scotland. The incentive to promote growth is weakened by the resultant 
absence of any direct and automatic link between economic growth and tax 
revenues accruing to the Scottish Parliament.18  But it should also be noted 
that the evidence on fiscal decentralisation and the promotion of growth is 
ambiguous (Hallwood & MacDonald, 2005). Nevertheless, this is a debate that 
will increasingly come to dominate devolution in the UK and, in our judgement, 
merits considerably greater emphasis. 
4. Co-ordination
One important consequence of devolution is the actual and potential tension 
between the (economic) interests of the devolved territories and the UK as a 
whole. While such tensions between region and nation are not new19, 
devolution has given them institutional significance. Scotland and Wales are 
free to pursue their own economic development policies that may conflict with 
the economic policy objectives of the UK government. Adams and Robinson 
suggest the example of the employment growth objective of the Welsh 
Assembly as creating a tension with the UK Treasury goal of higher 
productivity growth (page 13). Regional competition for mobile investment is 
                                           
18 However, it should be recognised that the regular updating of the population weights that 
has characterised the Barnett formula since the Darling amendment does provide a direct link 
between growth in population and the scale of the assigned budget of the Scottish 
Parliament. Since we would expect at least a part of population growth to be directly related to 
economic activity, we would expect a positive relationship between growth in Scotland and 
the assigned budget. The link is less direct and systematic than schemes of the type 
proposed by Hallwood and MacDonald, 2005.
19 For example, several UK governments have taken the view that a UK regional (or more 
precisely, interregional) policy would promote regional equity at the expense of national 
economic efficiency.
also cited as potentially damaging to other regions and, by implication, to the 
national economic interest (page 22). And, policies formed by Whitehall 
departments for English needs may have “adverse consequences for the 
poorer nations of the United Kingdom …” while a “UK-wide policy might take a 
very different approach” (page 17).
Clearly devolution increases the need for greater co-ordination from the 
centre, while preserving the spirit of the devolution settlement. However, if the 
UK is to deal with the issue of co-ordination effectively there needs to be a 
clearer understanding of the nature of regional interdependence in the UK and 
the institutional arrangements to deal with it. This issue is fundamental: in 
principle, at least, interregional interdependence is important for all economic 
policies with a spatially differentiated impact, whether administered by 
devolved or delegated authorities or by the Westminster government. While 
inward investment, for example, brings interregional competition into very 
sharp relief, economic interdependence renders virtually every policy at least 
a potential source of both interregional spillovers and gains from coordination.
Spillovers
Co-ordination is an issue principally because regions are interdependent. 
Regions and small countries are interdependent because they more open to 
trade and resource flows than larger jurisdictions. Hence, changes in 
economic activity in one region spill over to other regions through movements 
in trade, migration and capital flows. The problem for policy is that our -
including the devolved and UK governments – understanding of the nature 
and extent of economic spillovers between regions generally, and UK regions 
in particular, is limited20. The theoretical possibilities are understood but as 
McGregor and Swales (2005) point out the issue is essentially an empirical 
one. Interregional interdependence depends on the specific conditions 
affecting demand and supply in each region. And in the UK, the empirical 
research is lacking, with matters not helped by a lack of data on interregional 
flows of trade and finance.
                                           
20 See McGregor & Swales (2005, forthcoming) for a discussion of these issues.
This lack of understanding has, however, not stopped governments from 
taking and promoting a view of the UK interregional macro-economy. Until the 
election of the Labour government in 1997 the UK Treasury took the very 
restrictive view that a policy disturbance in a UK region would be met by 100% 
crowding out in other regions and so would have no net impact on national 
economic activity (McGregor & Swales, 2005)21. In contrast, the ‘new regional 
policy’ of the Labour government appears to be underpinned by a view that 
each region is independent with no significant spillovers from one to the other. 
McVittie and Swales (2003) characterise this about face by the Treasury as 
“very odd”. 
Two implications appear to follow from this volte-face. First, the focus of UK 
regional policy is on each region fulfilling its potential, with each English region 
treated as a mini-UK in the adoption of the Treasury supply-side agenda and 
the pursuit of policies to improve performance on the Treasury’s five 
productivity drivers. Adams and Robinson rightly note that these drivers 
exclude some of the more important drivers at the local level. The openness 
of regional economies suggests the importance of trade, migration and capital 
flows to regional development. In Scotland, this is recognised to some degree 
through the promotion of global connections within Smart Successful 
Scotland22 and the adoption of a migration policy: the Fresh Talent Initiative to 
help stem Scotland’s declining population. But at the UK government level 
probable interregional links are not considered. So, for example, the link 
between the problems of congestion and over development in the South East 
of England and the lower rates of job creation in the north and the attendant 
policy solutions are both ignored. Secondly, the perceived lack of regional 
interdependence has led to a failure by the UK government to develop the 
appropriate institutional arrangements to co-ordinate policy across the 
                                           
21 McGregor & Swales note that even simple demand re-allocations across regions would not 
necessarily result in 100% crowding out if supply conditions varied across regions.
22 Although in the 2004 “refresh” of Smart Successful Scotland the emphasis on promoting 
global connections appears to have diminished somewhat.
devolved – and English – regions to move closer to the joint maximisation of 
economic welfare (McGregor and Swales, 2005). 
Institutions
Devolution led to the adoption of new institutional arrangements in the UK to 
encourage co-operation amongst the devolved territories and the different 
levels of government: Concordats; Joint Ministerial Committees; and 
Committee of the Isles. But the view of political analysts is that such 
arrangements promote minimal co-operation and offer no formal policy co-
ordination (Jeffery 2004; Mitchell and Lodge, 2004). Adams and Robinson, in 
contrast, see the Treasury as playing a binding role both in thinking through 
the implications of devolution for territorial justice and in promoting UK-wide 
policies. We acknowledge that the Treasury is ideally placed to perform a co-
ordinating role. But that role is currently only exercised - with DTI and ODPM 
– through the PSA target on regional growth, which, as Adams and Robinson 
note no longer applies to the whole of the United Kingdom. We can think of no 
examples of the Treasury playing a binding or co-ordinating role with respect 
to Scottish economic development policy or any other Scottish Executive 
policy. The potential UK wide implications and tensions of unique Scottish 
policies on care for the elderly, teachers pay, university tuition fees and 
economic migration through the Fresh Talent Initiative, appear simply to have 
been ignored. Overall, the UK government has adopted a disjointed 
incremental approach to spatial institutional change, which is very fluid in 
England but which does not appear to be guided by an overall spatial 
institutional strategy23.
5. Conclusions
We consider Adams and Robinson’s analysis to be a useful and stimulating 
contribution. Our response from a Scottish perspective reflects rather different 
                                           
23 At the level of the English regions, targets, evaluation procedures, democratic 
accountability (the role of regional chambers and regional government offices), and long-term 
regional planning, all appear to be in a state of flux.
judgements about the significance of four key issues. First, we believe 
Scotland’s post-devolution experience has seen a significant degree of 
innovation in Scottish policy. Secondly, we do not believe that there is any 
evidence to suggest that devolution in Scotland was fundamentally motivated 
by the prospect of an economic dividend. However, devolution in Scotland 
(and elsewhere, and decentralisation more generally) has potentially 
important economic effects. Nonetheless, while the traditional fiscal federalism 
literature tends to emphasise the potential gains of devolution, there are 
undoubtedly also potential costs. The economic impacts of devolution are 
likely to be subtle and difficult to measure, but are no less important for this. 
Thirdly, we consider the funding of the devolved (and delegated) authorities to 
be of central importance to the long-term future of the devolution process in 
the UK. The sustainability of Barnett is a major issue, not least because its 
rigorous implementation is likely to impact adversely on the economies of the 
devolved territories. Consideration of alternatives is therefore an issue of 
some concern, and the debate on the appropriate degree of autonomy is likely 
to increase in importance through time, and not just for Scotland. And, 
fourthly, we feel the issue of the role of the centre and coordination is of even 
greater importance than Adams and Robinson suggest. In principle, any 
devolved, delegated or central economic policy may, in a system of 
interdependent regional economies, have important interregional spillover 
effects. This, in turn, may imply the potential for overall gains from the 
appropriate coordination of policies across the same and different levels of the 
governance structure. 
Finally, while identification of the key issues is comparatively straightforward, 
our current understanding of, for example, the likely macroeconomic 
consequences of alternatives to the Barnett formula and the scale and 
direction of various spillover effects is in its infancy. We are some way away 
from providing the evidence-base that should ideally be informing the conduct 
of spatially differentiated policies in the UK. 
